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Avoiding the blame game in managing 
problem black bears
MICHAEL L. WOLFE, Department of Wildland Resources, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-
5230, USA    michael.wolfe@usu.edu
In June 2007 a black bear (Ursus americanus) 
took an 11-year-old boy from the tent in which 
he was sleeping at a semi-
wilderness campsite in the 
Uinta National Forest in Utah 
and killed him. The off ending 
bear, a 381-pound adult male, 
subsequently was destroyed 
by personnel of the Utah Divis-
ion of Wildlife Resources and 
USDA/APHIS/Wildlife Servic-
es. The tragic incident, raises 
the number of recorded human 
fatalities caused by black bears 
during the period 1900–2007 
to about 52. Although deaths 
caused by large carnivores 
are rare, the media att ention 
associated with them focuses public concern 
for the responsibility of state and federal 
agencies for informing or shielding the public 
from hazards posed by wild animals on public 
lands. One ad hoc poll of the incident in Utah 
suggested that many people believed that the 
U.S. Forest Service should have done more to 
warn campers of the danger, including alerting 
them of a previous incident by the bear that was 
responsible for the boy’s death. Other people 
even have suggested that the campground 
should have been closed to the public.
My own research deals with cougars (Puma 
concolor) rather than bears, but the issues sur-
rounding bear and cougar att acks are strik-
ingly similar. Simply stated, human incursions 
into or encroachment upon wildlife habitat for 
recreational or residential purposes carry with 
them certain risks. Human fatalities caused by 
large carnivores such as black bears and cougars 
are exceedingly rare, averaging <1 death per 
year (Beier 1990, Floyd 1999, Hererro 2002). 
Deaths due to a spate of hazards associated with 
outdoor activities (e.g., bee stings, spider bites, 
dog bites, and lightning strikes) occur with far 
greater frequencies. Yet, when wildlife att acks 
do occur, they become high profi le and oft en 
att ract an inordinate degree of media att ention, 
possibly resulting in an amplifi cation of risk 
perception by the public (Gore 
et al. 2005). This is due, in part, 
to a culturally ingrained fear 
and loathing of large carnivor-
es in western society (Kellert et 
al. 1996).
Black bear populations in 
North America are increasing, 
albeit at varying rates in diff er-
ent jurisdictions (Garshelis and 
Hristienko 2006). The trend, 
coupled with increasing en-
croachment of humans into 
wildland habitats, both for 
residential and recreational 
purposes, carries greater prob-
ability for bear–human interactions. Unlike 
incidents with brown bears (Ursus arctos) in 
which maternal protection of cubs is frequent-
ly responsible for potentially fatal encounters, 
most incidents with black bears involve animals 
investigating or habituating to food items and 
trash associated with humans. In the western 
United States this situation is exacerbated in 
drought years when shortages of natural foods 
force bears to seek alternate foods in human-
dominated landscapes. This notwithstanding, 
Rogers (1992), who has researched black bears 
for 40 years, concluded that a miniscule fraction 
of an estimated population of 750,000 black 
bears in North America is naturally predatory.
Both state wildlife agencies and the U.S. 
Forest Service operate within the parameters 
of offi  cial protocols that defi ne their activities 
when dealing with potentially dangerous an-
imals, such as cougars and bears. The details 
of policies relating to black bear incidents diff er 
among states, but most of them feature the 
common element of a multi-tiered classifi cation 
of problem animals, be they either in residential 
or wildland areas. The categories are based on 
the animal’s level of (1) habituation to humans, 
(2) bold or aggressive behavior, (3) damage 
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to property, and (4) potential threat to human 
safety.
Utah’s policy is typical of those in several 
western states (Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources 2005, unpublished report). It cate-
gorizes bears into several levels. Level 1 bears are 
generally animals that have strayed into contact 
with human activities but are not habituated to 
humans and have caused no property damage. 
The policy recognizes that shortages of natural 
foods, especially in drought years, can result in 
increased interactions as bears seek alternative 
foods. Corrective measures for Level 1 bears 
typically involve removal of att ractants, as well 
as nonlethal means, such as hazing (with dogs) 
and aversive conditioning by shooting the 
animals with rubber slugs or other projectiles. 
In some instances, an animal may be captured 
and relocated to remote areas. Level 2 bears are 
animals that exhibit continued unacceptable 
behaviors, but pose no immediate threat to 
property, public safety, or livestock. These bears 
typically have become habituated to humans, 
and frequently they previously have been 
captured and relocated. Corrective measures 
generally include those applied to Level 1 
animals, i.e., removal of att ractants (food and 
trash) and, additionally, in some cases, tempor-
ary closure of campgrounds. Licensed hunters 
are sometimes used to remove Level 2 bears. 
Level 3 bears are chronic or acute off enders or 
have caused signifi cant property damage or 
pose a signifi cant threat to human safety. Corr-
ective action in these situations dictates that the 
off ending animal be destroyed. An important 
consideration is that policy provides some 
degree of discretion to agency personnel with 
respect to categorization of nuisance animals 
and the decision for appropriate corrective 
action.  As with any other management activity, 
human decisions are not infallible. 
Pertaining to the recent incident in Utah, a 
bear (assumed to be the perpetrating animal) 
had molested other campers the previous 
morning. The animal had torn open a campers’ 
tent, but was driven off .  Aft er the incident 
was reported to the Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources (UDWR), agency personnel decided 
pursuant to division policy to destroy the bear, 
and a team of experienced houndsmen were 
sent to kill the off ending animals. Unfortunately, 
their pursuit of the animal proved unsuccessful 
when the hounds lost its scent in the heat of the 
day. My knowledge of bear behavior indicates 
that an animal that has been pursued and har-
assed by hounds and humans for the bett er part 
of a day would be extremely unlikely to return 
to the site of the fi rst encounter.
Still, there remains the question of whether 
the U.S. Forest Service should have closed the 
developed campground in question or posted 
specifi c warnings at the remote campsite. 
Ample signage exists in the general area to 
warn campers of the presence of black bears 
and to advise appropriate behavior to minim-
ize the risk of potentially aggressive encounters 
with the animals. These general observations 
raise the question of how site-specifi c warnings 
about potential wildlife hazards must be, par-
ticularly when the majority of campers are in-
ured to such warnings. As an example, I pose 
an analogous hypothetical scenario. We know 
that vehicle collisions with deer and elk pose 
potentially fatal risks for motorists. To counter 
this threat, warning signs are posted along 
stretches of highway with a high prevalence 
of such collisions. However, because the per-
ceived frequency of such collisions is low, most 
motorists do not heed the warnings. Suppose 
that a fatal accident occurs within one of 
these marked stretches. Is it the responsibili-
ty of the UDWR or the Utah Department of 
Transportation (the keeper of the highway) to 
inform motorists that a specifi c fatal incident 
occurred at precisely that spot?
A larger philosophical question underlies 
this issue. To what degree is a governmental 
agency responsible for sterilizing the outdoor 
experience of all potentially fatal but highly 
improbable hazards, such as venomous snakes 
or even lightning strikes? Arguably, a small but 
real risk of such hazards is part of the allure of 
a wilderness camping experience. To cleanse 
the surroundings completely of all the natural 
hazards would tend to destroy a good part of 
the very att raction that draws visitors in the fi rst 
place. Alternatively, we can shield ourselves in 
the cocoon of a metal RV in a developed camp-
ground.  At an extreme, management agencies 
can prohibit camping in remote locations where 
even a miniscule possibility of danger from any 
hazard exists. Do we really want that?
The reality is that governmental agencies 
can warn campers only of the general threats 
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posed by wild animals at a given location and 
take measures to eliminate carefully identifi ed 
problem animals. In the case of the recent bear 
att ack in Utah, both these requirements were 
met. In the fi nal analysis, UDWR and U.S. Forest 
Service are no more accountable for this tragic 
incident than the Utah Geological Survey can 
be held responsible for the damage wrought 
by the next major earthquake or its inability to 
predict the precise occurrence of that event.
So, we should refrain from the blame game 
and the inevitable specter of litigation.  Instead, 
let’s take the initiative to learn more about the 
wildlife with which we share our environment. 
While the incident is unquestionably tragic, 
we must still balance the scales. Some risk 
(however small) is inherent to any outdoor 
activity. To att empt to assign blame to agencies 
that function, in part, to allow us to experience 
the natural world around us only deepens the 
sadness of this incident. 
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